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Selected problems of threats to the administration and the state in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022

Keywords: threats to the administration, threats to the state, the Russian-Ukrainian war

Summary. The paper focuses on the status of public administration, which is increasingly taking over the competences of other authorities in providing basic security for citizens. The issue here are not violations of the constitution or laws, which need to be discussed separately, but to point out that, even with formal respect for the separation of powers, we are facing profound changes that must be resilient to the state crisis. The recent accumulation of the policy of force points to a threat to the existing paradigm of public administration, and academic reflection and analysis of legal norms do not always sufficiently capture the danger of another world war. The study draws conclusions on the greatest dangers to firmly maintaining the systemic foundations of the separation of powers in a democratic state of law. The main dysfunctions in the development of the Ukrainian public administration, forced to choose between freedom and sovereignty and the lives of its citizens, were also identified. In this context, the issues of information policy and the consequences of the rapid development of information technology using the destruction of the population according to the so-called "Syrian model" are also shown. Due to the dynamics of the warfare and the impossibility to verify much of the information at the scene, the author relied heavily on films posted on the internet, information presented by the Ukrainian authorities and information from the war refugees themselves. Some of the information has been compiled from US Department of Defence (Pentagon) press releases.

Wybrane problemy zagrożeń dla administracji i państwa w kontekście wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej w 2022 r.

Słowa kluczowe: zagrożenia administracji, zagrożenia dla państwa, wojna rosyjsko-ukraińska

Streszczenie. Artykuł poświęcony jest statusowi administracji publicznej, która w coraz większym stopniu zaczyna przejmować kompetencje pozostałych władz w zakresie zapewnienia podstawowego bezpieczeństwa obywatelom. Nie chodzi przy tym o przypadki łamania konstytucji lub ustaw, które muszą być omówione odrębnie lecz o wskazanie, że nawet przy formalnym poszanowaniu trójpodziału władz mamy do czynienia z tak głębokimi zmianami, które muszą oprzeć się kryzysowi państwowemu. Kumulacja polityki siły w ostatnim czasie wskazuje na zagrożenie dotychczasowego paradygmatu administracji publicznej, a refleksja naukowa i analiza norm prawnych nie zawsze wystarczająco ujmują zagrożenie kolejną wojną światową. W pracy sformułowano wnioski dotyczące największych niebezpieczeństw przy stanowczym utrzymaniu ustrojowych podstaw trójpodziału władzy demokratycznego państwa prawnego. Wskazano także główne dysfunkcje w rozwoju ukraińskiej administracji publicznej, zmuszonej do wyboru pomiędzy wolnością i suwerennością a życiem

jej obywateli. W tym kontekście ukazano także zagadnienia polityki informacyjnej i konsekwencji burzliwego rozwoju technologii informacyjnej przy użyciu niszczenia ludności według tzw. „wzorca Syryjskiego”. W związku z dynamiką działań wojennych i brakiem możliwości zweryfikowania wielu informacji na miejscu autor oparł się w znacznej mierze o filmy zamieszczone w internecie, informacje przedstawione przez władze ukraińskie oraz informacje samych uchodźców wojennych. Część informacji została zebrana w oparciu o informacje prasowe Departamentu Obrony Stanów Zjednoczonych (Pentagonu).

1. The essence of local government and civic attitudes

Local government is an organisation of local community and at the same time a form of public administration, in which the residents form a community by law and decide with a high degree of autonomy on administrative tasks resulting from the needs of this community. In 2022, the administration faces a number of challenges in terms of which interests or objectives should be priorities for action. Weather anomalies, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the undeclared war of the Russian Federation and Belarus against Ukraine and the related problem of war refugees are difficult to address. The most prominent problem among these is the war, beginning to generate a conflict between civilisations of Europe and Asia, which in time may develop into a world war.

On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation's military aggression was launched from the territory of Russia, Belarus, the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Republics and occupied Crimea. An unprovoked war against Ukraine occurred with the use of cluster munitions and bombs, which have a wide area of effect, in Kiev, Kharkiv, Chernihiv and other localities¹. Even worse, *i.e.* in the town of Okhtyrka, the Russians used a TOS-1 Buratino thermobaric missile launcher, similar in effect to the use of nuclear weapons but on a smaller scale, prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons of April 10, 1981 (Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects)². The use of such weapons violates international humanitarian law and causes agony and death to both soldiers and civilians³. The Russians are also shelling civilians

¹ On May 30, 2008, 111 countries supported a ban on cluster bombs at a conference in Dublin. The Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on August 1, 2010.

² Effective as of December 2, 1983.

³ This type of armament works by spraying an aerosolised explosive charge over an area and then setting it off. The blast lasts much longer than that of a conventional explosive and uses up all the oxygen available in the area to generate a high-pressure shock wave. This creates vacuum, which then causes a return wave. The result is pressure/vacuum surges (as much as several hundred kg per square cm) that tear soft materials, causing *e.g.*, the so-called barotrauma of the lungs or damage to the inner ear. To make matters worse, the zero zone has very high temperatures reaching up to 3,000 degrees Celsius. A blast in a given area leads to a 100 percent mortality rate, but death will not always be quick, as some casualties may be dying in agony for several minutes after the attack.

and representatives of international organisations, which led to the tragic death of Maryna Fenina, a national member of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, on March 1, 2022, in Kharkiv (information according to OSCE sources)⁴.

The use during the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation of more than 500 mercenaries from the so-called Wagner Group⁵ and the 141st Motorised Regiment of the Chechen National Guard commanded by General Magomed Tushayev, famous for torture, executions, looting, rape and murder, to capture members of the Ukrainian government and representatives of state and local administration needs no comment and is a statement of caution for the authorities of the Member States of the European Union and NATO.

The war which is going on just outside Poland's borders should be properly interpreted because the seizure of the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl, the military actions and genocide which are taking place in Kiev, Kharkiv, Mariupol, Donetsk, Crimea and other Ukrainian territories carried out by the Russian Federation follow the methods developed according to the "Syrian model" (consisting in killing as many civilians as possible and intimidating the population) and are aimed at forcing migration flows.

To conclude, Ukraine has become the site of a civilisational struggle between the East, which represents a mentality comparable to that of the Golden Horde – a kind of power whereby one man determines everything and the rest nothing – and the democratic West. The Mongolian and then Russian (Kremlin) authorities completely reject any agreement, convention, cooperation, and consent between the subjects of international law. They recognise only the power of violence and understand only the language of force. Coming to quick conclusions, the Polish legislator should adapt the Act of November 21, 1967 on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland⁶ and other legal acts: Regulation of the Council of Ministers of June 25, 2002 on the Detailed Scope of Responsibilities of the Head of National Civil Defence, Heads of Voivodeship, District and Commune Civil

⁴ <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/513280> (accessed on 3.03.2022).

⁵ The Wagner Group is a private Russian military company funded by Vladimir Putin's trusted associate, the oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin. It operates as the Kremlin's 'long arm' and is deployed to conflict sites in which Russia is not officially involved. It consists of mercenaries (ex-soldiers, criminals, and various diversion and sabotage specialists). They are relatively highly paid by the standards of the Russian Federation. Additionally, their wages are tax-free. A strong incentive to join the ranks of the organisation is the informal insurance conditions in case of death during operational tasks. The heirs of the killed mercenary are paid high compensations amounting to millions of roubles. When you join the ranks of the Wagner Group, you hand over your identity papers to the organisation. In return, the organisation issues its identity discs to each mercenary. Mercenaries are informally transferred to destabilised regions of the world, directly by aircraft or ships of the regular Army of the Russian Federation. Hence, they can arrive in the area of operations unnoticed and without identifying documents.

⁶ Journal of Laws of 2021 item 372, 1728.

Defence (Journal of Laws of 2002 no. 96 item 850); Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of September 26, 2002 on Service in Civil Defence (Journal of Laws of 2002 no. 169 item 1391); Regulation of the Council of Ministers of June 25, 2002 on the Detailed Scope of Responsibilities of the Head of National Civil Defence, Heads of Voivodeship, District and Commune Civil Defence, Journal of Laws of 2002 no. 96 item 850; Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of September 26, 2002 on Service in Civil Defence, Journal of Laws of 2002 no. 169 item 1391; Regulation of the Council of Ministers of March 29, 2005 on the Principles of Employers Releasing Persons Called to Serve in Civil Defence in Connection with Combating Natural Disasters, Catastrophes and Environmental Threats from the Obligation to Perform Work (Journal of Laws of 2005 no. 60 item 518); Regulation of the Council of Ministers of March 29, 2005 on Positions Deemed to Be Equivalent to Civil Defence Service (Journal of Laws of 2005 no. 60 item 519); Regulation of the Council of Ministers of April 4, 2005 on the Uniforms of Persons Serving in Civil Defence (Journal of Laws of 2005 no. 84 item 722); Regulation of the Minister of National Defence of April 27, 2006 on Defining Categories of Reserve Soldiers Whose Assignment for Service in Civil Defence Requires the Consent of the Military Draft Commander (Journal of Laws of 2006 no. 83 item 576); Regulation of the Council of Ministers of January 7, 2013 on Systems for Detecting and Notifying Contamination Incidents and on the Competence of the Authorities in these Matters (Journal of Laws of 2013 item 96) to the aforementioned real threats which may soon take place in Poland. Amendments to the Emergency Management Act⁷ of April 26, 2007, and its implementing acts will also be required.

2. Data protection

Personal data is any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual. Individual information that, when combined, can lead to the identification of an individual also constitutes personal data. Protection of personal data of soldiers and representatives of territorial defence in Ukraine acquires special importance, since in addition to the buildings of administration of various levels, Russian occupiers are particularly intent on seizing mobile phone masts and radio and television masts. Then, they turn on their information propaganda and, using text messages, attempt to intimidate civilians and Ukrainian military personnel. A sample text message reads: "...Soldier of the Ukrainian army! Russia's army is already in Donetsk and Luhansk, run away while you still have a chance" or "...

⁷ Journal of Laws of 2022 item 261.

Soldier of the Ukrainian army! Russia's army is already in Kiev and Kharkiv, run away while you still have a chance" or "...Soldier of the Ukrainian army! Russia's military is already here, surrender while you still have a chance" *etc.*

The basic legal assumptions of personal data protection related to the specifics of functioning of a uniformed and armed formation such as the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the conditions of war acquire special significance. Threats to military information systems containing personal data and the conditions and standards that should be met by military units and other institutions of the Ministry of Defence in this regard can be crucial to the security of a country that is defending itself against an invasion.

In view of the fact that no one can be obliged, other than by law, to disclose information concerning his or her person, and that the protection of personal data in the Armed Forces of Ukraine generally does not differ from civilian standards under conditions of threat to the existence of the state, this has become an important problem to be solved. In view of the years-long preparations for a full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the recently disclosed documents show plans for the invasion were approved as early as January 18, 2022 (while alleged peace talks were held until the last day), and the invasion was scheduled to take 15 days. Military detachments of the Russian Federation have strictly defined objectives and tasks (combat tasks, with a table of *noms de guerre*, a table of command signals, a table of secret command, proscription lists with the names of political opponents who will be outlawed, punished with death, or subjected to other repression by Wagner, Chechen and Spetsnaz forces). The orders also include the acquisition of archives of military and civilian personnel and cooperating entities.

With the above actions in mind, it would be important to amend the following legal acts taking into account the specifics of the military and of the administration cooperating with it: 1) Regulation of the Minister of Defence of October 31, 2014 on Military Records of Professional Soldiers (Journal of Laws of 2014 item 1638, as amended); 2) Regulation of the Minister of National Defence of May 26, 2010 on the Scope, Manner and Place of Reconstruction of Military Records of Persons Subject to Mandatory Military Service (Journal of Laws of 2010 no. 105 item 663); 3) Regulation of the Minister of National Defence of October 8, 2010 on Keeping Military Records (Journal of Laws of 2010 no. 199 item 1321, as amended); 4) Regulation of the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration of November 17, 2009 on Registering Persons for the Purpose of Military Qualification and Establishing Military Records (Journal of Laws of 2009 no. 202 item 1565); 5) Regulation of the Minister of National Defence of June 14, 2004 on Military Records of Defence Services (Journal of Laws of 2004 no. 148 item 1556).

The specifics of functioning of the Polish Armed Forces requires special protection of personal data of professional soldiers or soldiers serving in a different capacity, as well as that of military personnel fulfilling the general duty to defend the Republic of Poland in various forms. The problem also concerns the cooperating administration. This forces military commanders, administrations, and employers to protect sensitive personal data from unauthorised access. This is personal data of professional soldiers and data on the course of their active military service, health, education, qualifications, marital and family status, distinctions, as well as judgments issued against the soldier in judicial, administrative, or disciplinary proceedings and professional liability. In addition, this is personal data of the army's personnel. Personal data in the army is processed on similar principles as in other organisational units, *i.e.*, in paper form, *i.e.*, in files, indexes, books, lists and other records, and in electronic form, *i.e.*, in IT systems, also in the case of data processing outside the data filing system.

To summarise: Russian military action under a foreign flag, or covert operations conducted to mislead, to create the impression that it is the Ukrainian people who are allegedly responsible for starting the war, dressing up its soldiers in the uniforms of the Ukrainian National Guard and then attacking the defenders, should be similarly provided for in Polish legislation. It should be noted that Russian occupiers are also despicably using cars that are disguised as ambulances (with symbols of the red cross on a white background) to transport ammunition and move troops. There have also been instances of shelling Ukrainians from RF tanks that were travelling with white flags, purportedly to surrender. The above barbaric actions should be included in the bill on defence of the homeland, which is being processed in the Polish Parliament⁸.

3. State secrecy

The issue of protecting state secrets is related to the political situation and the historical context in which the state has been situated over the years. State secrecy as a protected good related to state security has long been the focus of many legislators. The need to maintain certain secrets was strictly dependent on the activities of the state in the primarily military, but also political, economic, and scientific domains. It has long been an important element of state policy, on the one hand, to maintain the secrecy of certain information that could affect its defence or se-

⁸ Cf. A. Stec, *Konflikt na Ukrainie w świetle prawa międzynarodowego publicznego*, [in:] T. Pączek, *Bezpieczeństwo państw Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w kontekście konfliktu na Ukrainie*, Słupsk 2016, pp. 171-177.

curity, and on the other hand, to seek to obtain relevant information about the activities of other countries.

The miniaturisation of ICT devices and their widespread use allows very often for geotagging, which is a function of cameras, smartphones, tablets, and other devices that indicates GPS location data in the properties of the photo or video recorded. Although many social networks clear this type of data when photos are shared, if you receive the original photo files, the geotagging data will most likely still be preserved, assuming the person taking the photo does not delete it. The location information is stored as part of the metadata, which also includes details such as camera model, focal length settings, etc. So, those who are interested can view a table with information about the photograph. If the location data is stored, you will find it in the GPS section in the latitude and longitude fields. Based on this data, it is easy to find the place on the map where the photograph was taken and to programme various devices and destroy targets using military equipment.

Taking photographs of persons or facilities under wartime conditions, combined with the possibility of location, may cause a breach of state secrecy, and bring imminent danger to persons and state defence. Since 1999, there has been no ban on photographing state facilities in Poland, except for those important for the state security and defence. This is regulated by the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of June 24, 2003, on Facilities of Particular Importance for the Safety and Defence of the State and their Special Protection. These are facilities of the Police, Border Guard, and State Fire Service, as well as plants producing, repairing, and storing armaments, military equipment and means of warfare. This also applies to establishments where research and development or design work is carried out for production for national security and defence purposes. Therefore, prior to aggression against other states, Russian soldiers have their cell phones taken away, while the Ukrainian Army and the Territorial Defence Units of Ukraine forbid photographing defence infrastructure and thus verifying location data on social networks; this helps them avoid targeted shelling. A good example is the recent disabling of Google Maps in Ukraine to prevent them from contributing to many losses in this country.

A very big threat is generated by popular smartwatches, which, if used by people with access to essential state secrets, may contribute to irreparable damage to the defence capacity, security or other vital interest of the state. These devices collect a lot of important, yet seemingly insignificant, data about health, activity and more.

4. Threats to critical infrastructure

Critical infrastructure usually refers to the physical and cyber systems (facilities, equipment, or installations) necessary for the minimum operation of the economy and the state. It is important to note that not every strategic facility needs to belong to critical infrastructure. In our country, whether a facility qualifies as CI is determined by detailed criteria set forth in a classified annex to the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Programme.

According to the Emergency Management Act of April 26, 2007⁹, critical infrastructure means systems and their functionally connected facilities, including buildings, equipment, installations, and services crucial for the security of the state and its citizens and for ensuring efficient functioning of public administration, as well as institutions and enterprises.

Meanwhile, the Russian Federation's armed assault, in addition to targeting civilians, focuses on attacking the following:

- a) electricity and fuel supply systems,
- b) communications systems,
- c) ICT networks,
- d) financial systems,
- e) food supply chains,
- f) water, heat, and gas supply systems,
- g) health care,
- h) transportation,
- i) rescue systems,
- j) systems ensuring continuity of public administration,
- k) power systems (including the occupation of nuclear power plants, as on February 25, 2022, the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was occupied and on March 4, 2022, the armed forces of the Russian Federation shelled the Zaporizhzhia power plant, resulting in a fire at the site. Although the fire was extinguished, the premises of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant were occupied by the armed forces of the Russian Federation and the personnel of the two plants was taken hostage, which constitutes a kind of nuclear terrorism).

Although according to official news the aggression of the Russian Federation claimed more than 12,000 dead Russian soldiers¹⁰, it should be assumed that due to the massive attacks on civilian targets (hospitals, schools, orphanages, kindergartens) the number of victims who died in the rubble probably exceeded 3,000

⁹ Journal of Laws of 2022 item 261.

¹⁰ <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-rosia-vtraty-henshtab/31742419.html> (accessed on 9.03.2022).

as of March 9, 2022. The number is difficult to verify, especially since the OSCE offices in Kharkiv and Mariupol and the Red Cross offices *i.e.*, in Mariupol and other towns were destroyed and their representatives are not allowed to visit the war crime sites.

The warfare is a continuation of the hybrid war that has been going on for many years and has been conducted by Russian services using, *i.e.*, a virus called “Black Energy” as far back as 2015 and the “Telebots” software, which, by infecting computers, allows taking control over critical infrastructure. The targets of the most frequent attacks so far have been government websites, nuclear power plants and airports. The prelude to the war with Ukraine was the creation of a hybrid war on the Belarusian-Polish border in order to tie down Polish forces and resources and thus to prevent them from being used to help Ukraine.

Ukraine has been developing its Critical Infrastructure Protection System since 2014. It is modelled on global solutions, including those created by the Polish Government Centre for Security. Assistance to Ukraine in this area is organised by the NATO Liaison Office and the National Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Ukraine. The experience gained in the armed conflict cannot be overestimated for Poland, especially in the context of possible attempts to force the so-called “Suwałki Corridor” or the so-called “Corridor to Kaliningrad”, which are being considered with varying degrees of intensity in Russia¹¹.

5. Contemporary security challenges

In 2022, Europe will experience many new threats affecting its security, and its countries are constantly looking for new ways to both have an impact on and effectively defend against hard-to-define potential adversaries. The war launched at our borders preceded by hybrid actions on the part of Belarus acquires special significance in the context of hybrid war understood as a conflict conducted with the participation of states, international organisations, national and social groups, using all available means of struggle, with the participation of soldiers and civilians, started after the declaration of war or without it. Analysing the undeclared war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, one can observe its being conducted in violation of humanitarian law, many conventions, with significant participation of non-military means, with large-scale use of economic, political, information and propaganda activities, with different and shifting targets of attack, and being aimed at defeating the opposing side or forcing the desired action on it.

¹¹ For more on this, Cf. A. Sakson, *Geostrategiczne aspekty „problemu kaliningradzkiego”*, “Przełąd Strategiczny” 2011, no. 2, pp. 161-184.

Learning from the armed conflicts in Abkhazia, Transnistria, and the war in Ukraine, bringing chaos and widely using propaganda and acts of diversion, the importance of public administration and the armed forces in preserving sovereignty and territorial integrity can hardly be overestimated¹². It is therefore necessary to determine the quality of current and future capabilities of the public administration and the armed forces (state defence readiness) to counter threats to the state's existence. Today, the following questions need to be asked: Is the current national security system, including the state defence system, sufficiently prepared to meet emerging totalitarian threats? In which direction should international cooperation and internal defence capabilities develop to achieve security for the future? What should be the role of the administration in ensuring security and opposing, for example, the genocide of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine?¹³ Should top administrative officials – *i.e.* German Chancellors (Gerhard Schroeder, Angela Merkel) – blindly advance particularistic state interests, cooperating with people suspected of war crimes and genocide¹⁴, who, under the guise of a 20-million diaspora scattered deliberately on the territory of former Soviet republics, aim to rebuild Russia's superpower position? Intimidation of the Ukrainian people and other neighbouring states of the Russian Federation through torture, execution, rape and murder, and the use of nuclear weapons in case of direct assistance from other armies is a manifestation of the war of civilisations between East and West and is aimed at forcing migratory movements. It should be stated quite clearly that the Russian authorities are implementing a plan aimed at destroying Ukraine and, later, other post-Soviet republics, drawing them into their sphere of influence.

6. Conclusions

Before our very eyes and with great help from Polish state authorities and citizens, Ukrainians are defending the system of European values, which is the opposite of the forms originating from Asia and modelled on Genghis Khan. It is difficult to overestimate the role of civil society and the administration (represented, for example, by Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky, Kyiv's Mayor Vitali Klitschko, and many others) acting spontaneously when the army has to face an enemy that

¹² For more on this, see M. Sokół, *Mniejszość rosyjska jako instrument polityki zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej po 1991 r.*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, kwestie społeczne, ekonomiczne, polityczne i militarne*, Poznań 2020, pp. 159-169.

¹³ A more detailed analysis of the Russian Federation's pressure on the highest representatives of Ukraine can be found in A. Stec, *Pozycja ustrojowa prezydenta w systemie konstytucyjnym Ukrainy*, Lwów 2014, pp. 290-298.

¹⁴ Cf. A. Stec, *Konstytucyjna ochrona praw człowieka w realiach nadzwyczajnych zagrożeń dla bytu państwowego na Ukrainie*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo państw Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej, kwestie społeczne, ekonomiczne, polityczne i militarne*, Poznań 2020, pp. 171-192.

has a five-fold advantage in men and a seven-fold advantage in military equipment. It is almost impossible to find legal norms of armed conflict that were not violated by the troops of the Russian Federation after the February 24, 2022, assault on the Ukrainian state. The failure of former post-Soviet states (Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) to impose sanctions on Russia after the aggression is also alarming. Conducting military assaults on civilians moving through so-called humanitarian corridors and using civilians as human shields to cover tanks poses a threat to 'humanity' and the dignity of the human being in the 21st century. Unfortunately, the authorities of the Russian Federation recognise only the policy of force and disregard the force of arguments, and the former is the only way to stop the barbarism of Russian totalitarianism. It should also be borne in mind that in authoritarian states the decision-making process is much shorter than in stable democracies, and therefore instruments should be created to enable the administration to operate on an ongoing basis even in the event of armed or terrorist action, for example through greater access to weapons both in Poland and Ukraine. Increased access to weapons should of course be accompanied by training in their use. President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin respects only force. His usual pattern is to commit acts of aggression, take a look around, gauge the atmosphere and then, if there are no negative consequences, take the next step. With each successive act of terror, the criminal apparatus of the Russian Federation gains confidence and becomes more and more difficult to stop. There is no reason to believe that the vision of a Greater Russia announced by the Kremlin regime will be limited to Ukraine alone.

In conclusion, Russia should be expelled from all international and financial organisations and as many foreign ambassadors as possible should be withdrawn from the Russian Federation. There is no point in negotiating with the aggressor. The message from the international democratic community to the regime should be you can either stop and withdraw or be completely isolated. A crucial measure to achieve peace is to replace Russian oil and gas through OPEC decisions increasing production and to create optimum conditions for the administration to function even under war conditions, taking into account the Ukrainian experience.

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